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ABSTRACT
The social and political climate of the modern world has lead to increased concern over the ability of
engineered structures to resist blast events which may be incurred during terrorist attacks. While blast
resistance design has been prominent for years in the industrial and military setting, it is starting to gain
importance for structures which have been traditionally designed for aesthetics and which have high
occupancy density. In these situations it is important that not only materials but the geometry of the
building be optimized to reduce the effects of such an attack. However, designing a structure only for
prescribed code requirements does not necessarily give a prediction of the post-blast behavior of the
structure. Similar to the use of performance-based engineering for seismic events, the effects on a
structure designed for blast loading should not be speculative but rather should exhibit expected
behavior which is appropriate for the parameters of the given blast. Accounting for uncertainty of a
potential blast event by assessing the structure in a probabilistic approach may lead to a more prudent
and predictable assessment of damage and loss for the owner. The work herein attempts to provide an
overview of the precedent of use of probabilistic methods in structural engineering, the current state of
practice in blast engineering and set forth a framework and example by which probabilistic methods
may be extended to blast considerations.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
The need to design civil structures which may resist the loads created by blast events is not a new
concept in the field of structural engineering. However, the nature of blast threats has changed in recent
decades and concerns have spread to broader building occupancies. Blast design has traditionally been a
concern in military, secure government, and industrial facilities. However, attacks on the World Trade
Center in 1993 (see Figure 1.1) and the Murrah Building in 1995 (see Figure 1.2) are largely credited with
bringing to light the security risks of office buildings which may have an inherent social or political
significance (Whittaker et al., 55). As methods in the structural engineering field advance, it is necessary
that appropriate action and diligence be taken to extend the evolving methods of recognizing and
designing to reduce risk in this newly recognized field of necessity. The need to evaluate the risk of
structures to explosive attacks, as well as the systems susceptibility to failure within a range of possible
plausible attacks, is one that has not yet been fully recognized. With the inherent uncertainty of any
form of extreme loading, especially one so dependent on building occupancy, human perception, and
security effectiveness, the task of fully understanding a structure's risk to blast events is a complicated
one. The issue may therefore benefit from the use probabilistic methods, which have become prevalent
in other areas of structural engineering. It is proposed that such a probabilistic approach, if organized
and approached properly, may provide greater insight into the analysis of both existing and proposed
structures. The following herein will attempt to provide an overview of the current state of practice in
blast engineering, address the major pitfalls of current deterministic design methods, establish a
framework of establishing risk, performance criteria and analysis parameters, and use such parameters
to perform a simulation on a theoretical facility to illustrate the possible methods and results from such
an analysis.
Figure 1.1 View of damage from 1993 World Trade Center bombing (Source: geopolicraticus.wordpress.com)
Figure 1.2 Aerial view of post-collapse Murrah Building (Source: TruthAlliance.net)
1.2 Current State of Blast Engineering
Currently, blast engineering is typically dictated by code provisions and recommendations by governing
bodies in the engineering field. The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Structural Engineering
Institute has a Committee on Blast, Shock, and Impact in which there is an active subcommittee titled
the Sub-Committee on "Standards for Blast Design" and which also previously had a Sub-Committee on
"Design for Physical Security." Standards have been established in which methods of identifying risk, as
well as design recommendations and loading characteristics are established. Moreover, the General
Services Administration (GSA) has established strict code requirements for government buildings which
include requiring facades to be resistant to a minimum prescribed pressure as well as including
redundancy to avoid progressive collapse. Such requirements include the structural stability of a
building with the loss of a major load-bearing wall or column in the first two levels (GSA Security Criteria,
5-10). Other design institutes, including the American Concrete Institute (ACI) and the American
Institute for Steel Construction (AISC) have also released publications and design recommendations
which may aid designers in creating more blast resistant structures.
While there has obviously been a large range of research and publication of design code and
recommendations which address blast design, it should be noted that the standard practice of blast
engineering is indeed deterministic. These prescriptive design requirements, such as those rigidly
established by the GSA, do account for the stochastic nature of explosions in part through the
establishment of loads in a similar manner to the Load and Resistance Factor Design method. However,
such methods do not allow for the determination of characteristic behavior of a structure in which such
prescriptive loads may be exceeded or additional load bearing members be damaged. Additionally,
these design methods do not necessarily provide insight into the probabilistic risk of damage other than
any inferences which may be drawn during the procedure of designing to mitigate progressive collapse.
1.3 Probabilistic Methods in Structural Engineering
The need to better understand structural response to earthquakes beyond the use of prescriptive design
spectra has lead to the development of performance-based methods in the last two decades. Coming
from a desire to ensure and understand the damage states which may be expected for certain intensity
earthquakes, probabilistic methods attempt to consider earthquakes with distinct probabilities of
occurrence. While this provides no guarantee of the load events which will actually be seen in a
structure's life, it does establish an expected performance associated with prescribed intensities.
Damage States
Immediate Life Collapse
occupancy safety prevention
Qualitative performance levels
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Figure 1.3 Qualitative Performance Levels per FEMA 273/274/356 (Source Whittaker et al., 58)
The principles behind the use of probabilistic methods are the establishment of well defined
performance criteria consisting of damage states and loss and the use of a reasonable range of loading
patterns applied to a structure which are desired to produce such performance. Typical performance
criteria relate to the safety and damage of a structure following the loading event of concern. In the field
of earthquake engineering three basic performance criteria levels have been established including:
immediate occupancy, life safety and collapse prevention. As defined by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), these three primary performance levels are shown qualitatively in Figure
1.3 and described in greater detail in Table 1.1. The damage states are associated with deformation of
the structure with non-structural damage resulting from excessive deformation which may be elastic
and structural damage resulting from inelastic, permanent, deformation of the structure.
Performance level Damage description DowAnime
Immediate occupancy Negligible structural damage: essential systems 24 hours
operational; minor overall damage
Probable structural damage; no collapse;
Life safety minimal falling hazards; adequate emergency Possible total loss
egress
Collapse prevention
Severe structural damage: incipient collapse:
probable falling hazards; possible restricted
access
Probable total loss
Table 1.1 Building Performance Levels per FEMA 273/274/356 (Source: Whittaker et al., 58)
Force
parameter
..... ....... ..  ..... .
2 Assessing Threat and Risk
2.1 Stakeholders
Since the threat of a blast event in a structure depends largely on human and process influence on the
building, it is necessary that in order for a facility to be appropriately analyzed for risk that the people
who will have the most information on the operation of the facility be able to provide insight. Since
damage incurred on certain equipment may in itself cause additional hazard, such possible cascade
effects must be taken into account in order to provide a true representation of blast threat. Additionally,
since a large goal of performance-based engineering seeks not only to avoid loss of life but minimize
financial loss, it is necessary that any technical specialists, building occupants, the building owner,
security representatives, mechanical and plumbing sub consultants and architects provide information
which may help to establish possible points of interest in a building and help to quantify monetary
damages from loss of certain assets (Conrath et al., 1-2). It is therefore suggested that prior to an
analysis which may seek to establish the performance of any facility that all appropriate stake-holders
be consulted and play a role. This is essential for the determination of the possible threat to all or parts
of that facility and the safety and financial risks associated with loss of any portions of the building.
2.2 Quantifying Assets
As referred to above in Section 2.1, when attempting to establish a framework which quantifies loss due
to both structural and asset damage, a thorough analysis of the interdependence of all facility systems
must be analyzed. In the framework being established herein, assets are to be viewed as targets and
therefore can be broken down into two different subcategories: primary assets and secondary assets. A
primary asset is one which may be viewed as a likely target of aggression while a secondary asset is a
component which is interdependently related with a primary asset that would allow the function of the
secondary asset to affect the function of the primary (Conrath et al., 1-3).
It should be stated that the asset to be protected first and foremost is human life; per Canon 1 of the
ASCE Code of Ethics an engineer "shall hold paramount the safety health and welfare of the public
(ASCE)." Human welfare should always be prescribed as the most important of primary assets. However,
immediate occupant safety is not the only concern for which this primary asset must be protected.
Indeed, certain facilities may have an equally large need to protect secondary assets, such as industrial
facilities which may contain hazardous materials or nuclear power facilities in which the effects on
immediate building occupancy may be far less influential to human life and public welfare than the
potential widespread damage which may be caused by the failure of any operational subsystems. While
these examples are unique to certain facilities, more common examples of relationships between
primary and secondary assets include a system deemed as a primary asset and its power supply which
serves as a secondary asset or a security system which serves to prevent access to the primary asset
(Conrath et al., 1-2). Another key aspect in quantifying assets is the replaceability of the asset; often the
true price of loss of an asset exceeds the difference between its salvage value and its purchase cost.
There are many instances, especially in the case of large and long-term equipment, in which installation
considerations are major undertakings.
For the purposes of establishing performance states in a blast analysis, the structure itself must also be
considered an asset with certain primary and secondary elements. The risk of total loss or progressive
collapse of a structure is one which must be mitigated, for both safety and financial reasons, with high
certainty to the highest degree of likely probable threat. However, even if a structure does not
experience collapse following a blast event, any inelastic structural response must be repaired.
Additionally, as addressed previously, another key aspect in quantifying a structural member's asset
value is the cost of installation. For example, the replacement of a major load bearing column is a more
costly undertaking then the repair of a section of floor slab or an infill beam.
2.3 Evaluating Threat
Once the major assets, dependence of assets, and values of assets have been defined, it is necessary to
determine what the threat of an attack on any given asset might be. There are several aspects which
may contribute to the threat on an asset, detailed further within this section, which account for the
significance of an asset, the attainability of certain explosive devices and the opportunities which may
allow such devices to be used.
2.3.1 Target Attractiveness
One of the first and most easily understood aspects in evaluating the threat on an asset is the
significance of that asset and how this significance might make it attractive for a group or individual to
eliminate or damage it. Some obvious examples of asset target attractiveness are buildings with historic
or political significance. Such sites must be strongly considered as targets for terrorist attacks. Since
buildings of this sort may be sought out solely for the significance of what broader ideals they may
represent, often the global structure itself may be viewed as the primary asset most targeted as the
destruction of the structure may achieve an ideological statement. This method of target selection is
very evident in the bombing of the Murrah Building, both the 1993 and 2001 attack on the World Trade
Center and the 2001 attack on the Pentagon. While these attacks also have motives relating to
operational disruption, they serve to show that a symbol of significance potentially makes a structure an
asset at risk.
The other major aspect in evaluating an asset's risk of attack is its criticality to other functions. For
example, a power plant's ability to provide power to a large area of customers would make it a critical
asset for the region and therefore subject to a high level of risk. Similarly, any structures or facilities
which may themselves provide a necessary function of safety, such as levees or dams and their
regulating facilities, should be considered to have a high level of risk compared to standard use facilities.
2.3.2 Accessibility
Since the delivery of an explosive device to the site at which it is intended to explode is necessary for an
attack to be carried out, when evaluating a threat to an asset it is necessary to examine the proximity to
the asset which may be achieved by an attacker. While accessibility is some obviously limited by the
physical characteristics of a facility and the surrounding site, in many cases the accessibility is
determined by the defined operation procedures of the facility and therefore relies on technological and
human input. Therefore, when establishing a model which may determine the possible locations of an
explosive device at detonation, physical limitations of accessibility may be viewed as deterministic and
may be modeled as null regions for possible blast load origins. However, such zones which may be
limited by operational procedures must be considered to have a certain probability of entrance and
delivery of an explosive device. This must be evaluated through a thorough examination of security
procedures and any inherent weaknesses.
2.4 Limitations of Deterministic Design
In evaluating the risk of a structure and facility assets within, it becomes apparent that the definition of
risk and parameters are complex and difficult to encompass through deterministic and prescriptive
design guidelines. Rather, it is unrealistic to attempt to predict the potential stand-off distance of a blast
from structural elements and facility assets. While deterministic design is valuable in instances of
increasing the robustness of a structure and its ability to withstand blast loading it provides no
indication of likely damage states under certain blast events and is therefore analogous to the state of
seismic engineering prior to the advent of performance-based earthquake engineering. That is, following
a blast event, there is likely to be a response which may not have been predicted and a disconnect
between the structural engineer and the owner of a facility as to how the building has performed
(Whittaker et al., 63). It becomes clear upon examination that the use of deterministic design
recommendations and code regulations, set forth by such organizations as ASCE and GSA, may be used
in conjunction with probabilistic methods. In this way, the minimum performance of components may
still be preserved. However, information collected from a probabilistic assessment of blast performance
may be used to supplement such guidelines. This may indeed lead to an increase in safety as well as
better mitigate financial loss through the formulation of a more robust design method than
deterministic design on its own.
3 Typical Design Recommendations
In designing a structure to resist blast loads there are two basic categories which envelope the measures
which may be taken to mitigate the success of an attack to damage the structure. The physical security
of a structure refers specifically to the structure, architectural aspects, and surrounding site which may
be designed in a way to either deter or limit the ability to attack or to withstand the loads produced if
there is an attack. Since such physical features exist at the site and do not require continuing operation
they are also often referred to as passive security. Additionally, a facility with security which
continuously provides additional security systems which do not exist without ongoing maintenance and
operation may be said to implement operational, or active, security. Such systems are subject to human
and technological limitations which must be considered without optimism.
3.1 Physical (Passive) Security
Physical security may be provided by several design considerations. A major consideration in increasing
a structures resistance to blast loading is increasing its strength and ductility. However, other less
obvious design strategies may be used to reduce damage due to a blast by ensuring symmetrical lateral
load resisting systems and by limiting accessibility.
3.1.1 Hardened Exteriors
A way to mitigate the effects of a blast event on a structure is simply to harden its exterior and allow
blast pressures to be taken by the building without significant failure. It is necessary that a hardened
exterior reduce the transmittal of forces to the interior components of the structure designed for
standard serviceability considerations. This is often accomplished through two primary designs; a thick,
well reinforced concrete exterior or a strengthened steel curtain wall. While the obvious solution to
potential external blast attacks is to provide a strong concrete exterior, recent advances in materials and
glazings have allowed architectural concerns to gain more influence in the blast design field. Thus, more
innovative and aesthetically pleasing solutions have begun to gain prominence in typical buildings
designed for blast concerns.
Concrete is a naturally effective material for shielding against blast pressures. It has a high mass, surface
resistance to penetration and fragmentation, and when reinforced with steel, may dissipate energy
efficiently through crack formation. Additionally, it is relatively economically efficient to create a large
surface barrier using concrete due to its low unit price and wide use in the construction field. However,
beyond external blast walls, concrete can be a difficult material to use effectively for a structural system
as it is a brittle material and therefore poses a challenge when attempting to design a globally ductile
structural system. While progress has been made recently to increase the ductility of concrete beam-
column joints due to seismic concern, there is a lack of construction experience in many areas of low to
moderate seismic concern and therefore detailing more ductile connections in such construction
markets would prove to be difficult. Additionally, concrete's poor tensile strength does not allow flexural
members to remain stable under large deflections due to catenary action. While this does not discount
concrete as a primary structural material for a building being designed for blast loading, strong
considerations must be taken to ensure that there is not an onset of progressive collapse due to a lack
of ductility (Punch, 132).
Concrete has become a material of choice for use with other materials to form blast-resistant composite
walls. Figure 3.1 shows a cross-section of such a product (produced by Aigis) which utilizes several
materials including a hardened surface designed to fracture without producing large and dangerous
projectiles, a flexible energy-absorbing layer and a final layer of concrete to provide overall strength
against blast pressures. Such a system may be used both in interior and exterior walls and provides an
example of a concrete blast wall which is not only intended for use with concrete construction, make it
versatile for use in different projects (Aigis).
Figure 3.1 Cross-section of Aigis blast resistant wall product (Source: Aigis Blast Protection)
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In comparison with concrete, steel is a much more ductile material and therefore is desirous for use in
structures which may see extreme dynamic loads. When coupled with steels ability to form catenary
action, these characteristics allow the preservation of stability under very large deflections. It is
therefore desired in many cases that the primary structural system for a structure in which blast, or
earthquakes for that matter, be steel frame (Punch, 132). However, it is impractical that for a typical
building steel be used as a total barrier against severe blast pressures. Also, plate steel is susceptible to
penetration from blast fragments and projectiles (Bulson). Therefore, while steel itself is not a suitable
material for enveloping a building, recent advances in glazings and blast resistant glasses has allowed
the use of steel to create blast resistant curtain walls. In this way, a continuous barrier may be formed
by such glasses and carry loads to a steel frame capable of absorbing the blast impulse; Figure 3.2 shows
such a curtain wall under construction. Such construction provides much more flexibility and is
especially appealing to architects. For these reasons, blast resistant steel frame curtain walls are
becoming fairly normal in the blast design field (Punch, 133).
Figure 3.2 Blast curtain wall under construction (Source: Hardened Structures)
3.1.2 Strengthened Connections
Structural systems subjected to any form of high intensity impact or dynamic loading require additional
considerations to allow the system to deflect and dissipate energy without experiencing inelastic
deformation under immediate occupancy performance states and without experiencing catastrophic
failure under life safety and collapse prevention performance states. In order to achieve such ductility, it
is necessary that the connections between individual structural members be not only stronger than the
yielding limits of the elements it joins but ductile enough to maintain a connection through its own
- --- --- ------------  ... ........
inelastic deformation. Such connections may be more reliably achieved in steel frame and precast
concrete buildings than in monolithic, cast in place concrete frames.
Steel frame connections for dynamic loading fall generally into two different categories: brace and
moment connections. Most work in detailing such brace connections has focused on detailing adequate
gusset plates. Gusset plates allow the connection to maintain strength with greater deflections due to
the two-dimensional nature of plates which allows tension-field action to maintain strength in the plate
after buckling occurs. The use of gusset plates is very desirable, therefore, compared with standard weld
or bolted end plate connections, allowing for out-of-plane deformation and the formation of plastic
hinges (Lundeen, 25-2). Such gusset connections are displayed in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 with Figure
3.3 showing the use of the brace connection with a standard shear connection between the beam and
column of the frame.
Figure 3.3 Seismic beam-column-brace welded gusset connection (Source: Lundeen, 25-5)
Figure 3.4 Seismic brace-beam welded chevron gusset connection (Source: Lundeen, 25-7)
Similar considerations are taken with moment frame connections and one specific detail, patented by
Side Plate, is gaining popularity in use. The schematic of such a moment connection is shown in Figure
3.5; it can be seen that the moment connection is established through the attachment of the "cover
plates" which allow transmission of loads in the flanges to the column in the same fashion as a typical
flange-plated fixed moment connection. The connection is then strengthened against shear and torsion
by the vertical shear plates. Similar to the use of gusset plates, the side plates on the connection are
what truly give it additional ductility; again, by loading a plate multi-directionally it is possible to
experience large rotational deformations in the column while still maintain capacity to keep the join
intact. With regards to Section 3.1.1, Figure 3.6 shows the use of such a connection in the construction
of a blast resistant steel curtain wall (Punch, 134).
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Figure 3.5 Side Plate moment connection (Source: Punch, 138)
Figure 3.6 Strengthened blast connection (Source: Hardened Structures)
.. ..............
While steps have been made to ensure greater ductility in cast-in-place beam-column joints the vast
majority of advances in increasing ductility have come in precast concrete joints. Figure 3.7 shows a
patented ductile precast connection in which the stiffness of the joint is governed by ductile embedded
rods which are well confined by the column in which they are anchored. This ensures that the shear and
moment transfer into the beam will not exceed certain values prescribed by the designer and ensures
that the concrete beam itself will stay intact (Englekirik, 217-219).
Figure 3.7 View of Dywidag Ductile Connector (DDC) System (Source: Englekirk, 217)
For the modeling a building frame subjected to blast loading, the type of connections used is an
important consideration when determining the precision of model needed in order to accurately
represent structural behavior. Any analysis which uses frame elements without modeling connections
themselves may lose reliability if the connections are under-designed for dynamic loading. That is, for
example, the reliability of an analysis of a moment frame under severe loading and deformations may
be unexceptably low if the moment connections represented in the model to not allow substantial
plastic deformation. If connections were to fracture, the assumption of energy dissipation through
rotation of plastic hinges is null.
.............. ............
3.1.3 Building Geometry
Two major aspects of building geometry may contribute to the amplification of blast effects. Different
envelope shapes may intensify the blast loading experienced by the building itself while the placement
of lateral load resisting systems (LLRS) may very well dictate the post-blast structural behavior. Such
concerns often have architectural implications and therefore it is necessary that a structural engineer
adequately address such issues for a building being designed in order to understand the hazards which
may result from such geometry choices. When designing a building which may be subjected to blast
pressures, any vertices forming L or U-shapes in a building's fagade will serve to amplify loads. It is
therefore advised that any reentrant corners be avoided when possible (Conrath et al., 3-10).
Additionally, if any such geometry is used, a detailed study should be carried out before running an
analysis to determine what the amplification of pressures will be and these amplifications should be
applied appropriately to ensure the adequacy of a faeade and its structural system.
The use of symmetrical LLRS placements is strongly advised in order to decrease the probability of
progressive collapse in a building. Studies of the collapse of the Murrah Building in 1995 show that the
vast portion of the building which collapse was due in part to a lack of lateral load resistance at the front
of the building (Nair, 3). Since the loss of structural members tends near a blast origination point tends
to create forces towards this point due to inward local collapses, a lack of bracing or shear walls in the
region allows the local collapses to spread until the members at the edge of previous collapse are in
close enough proximity to members which may adequately resist these lateral loads. While not a large
concern in moment frames, for any steel braced frames it is necessary to symmetrically locate LLRS
appropriately also to help avoid any torsional effects on the structre which may result in a structural
framing discontinuity near the blast origin point.
3.1.4 . Load Reversal and Redundancy Considerations
The major causes of major structural failure and collapse in a building subjected to blast loading is not
only excessive pressures but the application of loads in an opposite direction of design loading and the
lack of stability provided by a damaged structural system. Especially in the case of internal explosions,
structural members such as beams and slabs, which are designed only for gravity loads, may experience
a strong and complete reversal of forces. For this reason, it is necessary that such load reversals be
accounted for. This may be done by keeping continuous reinforcement in concrete members as well as
ensuring that a reasonable pressure be considered for any steel beams which may have a lower moment
capacity due to a decrease in compression flange restraint. However, it is infeasible to prevent the loss
of any members under some blast loading conditions. In this case, it is necessary that redundancy be
built into the structural system to ensure that a new, stable load path may be established. Redundancy
considerations should allow for the loss of major structural members at the bottom two levels of a
building. Two-way slabs are also recommended in order to ensure more flexibility in load redistribution
(Perez).
3.1.5 Site Design
As discussed previously in Section 2.3.2 accessibility plays a large role in the threat of a building to a
blast attack. When considering any bomb delivered by a vehicle accessibility may be viewed as a concern
of the combination of both physical and operational security. For the purpose of this section the effects
of physical design to accessibility will be considered. Site design may be used to form either a perimeter
around a facility so that vehicles, or in more severe cases people, may not ever come within a certain
prescribed proximity of the facility; typical bollard and physical obstacle implementation can be seen in
Figure 3.8. This ensures with fairly reasonable certainty that the maximum considered explosive device
may not reach a standoff distance to produce damage exceeding the desired performance level and may
rightfully justify the use of deterministic design. However, site design to limit accessibility may also be
used in a way which may limit certain areas deemed most critical, such as points of high human traffic or
concentration of windows. In many instances a facility may not practically ensure such a physical barrier
around a building for several reasons: facilities may require entrance of vehicles for deliveries or may
require close proximity parking due to limited site space. In such cases it is necessary to evaluate what
portions of exterior have had access reliably restricted and, for the purpose of the probabilistic methods
presented herein, what the relative probabilities of access to certain portions of the exterior are.
Figure 3.8 Use of physical barriers to limit access (Source: Whole Building Design Guide)
3.2 Operational (Active) Security
Since operational security relies on the proper functioning and implementation of either technological
or human systems it is more susceptible to variable performance. For this reason, regions of a facility
and its site which are controlled using operational methods may be better understood and designed
with the use of probabilistic methods to aid in understanding areas of vulnerability and risk. Whether for
use in the design of a facility or for analysis, it is necessary that an accurate and realistic estimation for
the effectiveness of any system be taken into account as probabilities associated with the success of a
security system is conditional with the probability of reaching certain performance states in the case of
an explosive attack.
Operational security should consist of two general tasks: risk identification and threat mitigation. Risk
identification should typically be aligned with the conclusions drawn during the quantification of assets
and evaluation of threats detailed in Chapter 2. Operational security systems should give strong
preference to the surveillance of regions of close proximity to major assets. Threat mitigation can be
achieved in several basic methods ranging from looking for suspicious behavior to completely limiting
access to a region besides authorized personnel. Also, screening and searches, such as the use of metal
detectors, may be used as a security measure which does not limit access but help to ensure that no
explosive devices may enter certain regions.
4 Blast Load Characteristics
4.1 Basics of Explosions
An explosion, contrary to deflagration, refers to a chemical reaction by which pressures within a mass of
explosive propagates through the material away from a point of initiation. Unlike deflagration (the
method of combustion of gunpowder), in which the material maintains a uniform internal pressure
equal to the surrounding pressure while producing gasses, a high-explosive generates an outward wave
velocity as it combusts. The primary necessity for a material to be considered an explosive is the
materials ability to supply energy through chemical reaction which allows the further propagation of the
shock wave. The rapid expansion of the gasses outward from the explosive casing focus into a high
density wave known as the shock front or blast wave. The blast wave travels through air and acts
essentially as a near-instantaneous spike in pressure, the magnitude of which is referred to as peak
overpressure which dissipates with time as shown in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.1 also shows the typical blast
wave characteristic of both a positive and negative phase; suction occurs in a blast zone after the major
blast wave impact. The exact dissipation characteristics vary greatly depending on the environment in
which the blast occurs. Much work, theoretical and experimental, has been done to understand the
exact nature of blast waves, mostly during and immediately following World War 11.
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Figure 4.1 Simplified and normalized plot of blast pressure vs. time (Source: Bulson)
At a generalized level, the effects of explosions on civil structures may be viewed as being less critical for
external blast events and more critical for internal explosions. As will be discussed in greater detail
herein, external explosions, while potentially much larger for terrorist threats, typically result in fairly
uniform pressures which often act in the same direction as primary loads on the building and therefore
are more readily resisted. However, the potential for opposite direction of loading on elements due to
internal explosions often results in greater damage due to internal explosions. Especially when
considering concrete frames and composite steel beam/floor slab construction this load reversal may
result in underconservative design of elements or lack of stability. Well designed frame buildings are
inherently resistant to blast effects, especially external (Bulson). This is due, in part, to the
decentralization of the LLRS compared to braced or shear wall reinforced structures.
4.2 Types of Explosive Devices
While there have been many different high explosives developed, they are typically scaled to a standard
of trinitrotoluene (TNT). TNT was one of the first safe and reliable explosives and gained broad military
and civil use and therefore has been used as a comparison point for all other explosive impulses, shock
wave velocities and overpressures. For probabilistic purposes, it is necessary to consider the ranges of
pressure loadings which are associated with the use of different explosive materials. The scaling of blast
load characteristics of different materials is addressed further in Section 4.3.
While it is important to understand the differences between explosive devices, a more important
consideration when considering probabilistic loading due to blast events is the amount of explosive
which may be successfully delivered and its method as this dictates the reasonably considered load
magnitudes as well as the blast load origin. Table 4.1 details several of the bomb delivery methods and
the approximate reasonably considered weights of explosive.
Firebomb or incendiary device Less than I lb (0.5 kg)
Postal plosive device 1-5 lb (0.5 - 2.5 kg)
Pipe bomb 1-5 lb (0.5 - 2.5 kg)
Man-portable explosive device 5-50 lb (2.5 - 25 kg)
Compact sedan 500 lb (225 kg)
Full-size sedan 1,000 lb (455 kg)
Passenger or cargo van 4,000 lb (1,815 kg)
Small moving van or delivery truck 10,000 lb (4,53 5 kg)
Large moving van or water truck 30,000 lb (13,605 kg)
Semi-trailer 60,000 lb (27,210 kg)
Table 4.1 Types of explosive devices/deliveries and relative TNT equivalent weights (Source Sullivan et al., 53)
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4.3 Blast Scaling
It is intuitively obvious that the magnitude of pressures observed decrease as the distance from the
blast point of origin of the increases. While there are several theories by which scaling is described, the
most commonly accepted method of scaling blast loads is Hopkinson-Cranz scaling which relates a
scaling factor to the cube root of the energy of the explosive device.
RZ=w/ 3
Equation 1
Equation 1 shows this form of scaling where Z is a scaling coefficient, R is the distance from the
observation point to the center of the blast origin, and W is the TNT-equivalent weight of the explosive.
This factor is then used in several variations of empirical formulas which attempt to relate the scaling
factor to observed peak overpressures. While there are many formulae which have been proposed,
many are specific to charge shapes, explosive type or are valid only for certain explosive sizes.
500
Po_ Z2
Equation 2
Equation 2, however, presents an approximation for the peak overburden pressure (po) which is often
used for preliminary design. While more detailed definition of explosive types and sizes could be used to
develop an increased reliability in pressures, such a generalized equation suits well a probabilistic
analysis as the range of pressures and impulses are more important than the precise representation of
one blast event (Bulson).
Since a number of explosive materials may be used, as detailed in Section 4.2, it is also important that
the charge weight is appropriately scaled to the standard of TNT. The term W Equation 1 refers to
equivalent weight and therefore the type of explosive must be considered when scaling the pressures of
the blast wave. This is done by comparing the heat of detonation for each explosive as detailed in
Equation 3 (Conrath et al., 2-9).
W (AHe)Wexp
Equation 3
where:
W=TNT equivalent charge weight
AHexp =heat of detonation of explosive
AHTNT=heat of detonation of TNT
Wexp=weight of explosive
Additionally, another aspect of blast loading, besides the peak overburden pressure, is its impulse which
is described as follows in:
td
I = p(t)dt
0
Equation 4
where:
I=impulse
td=duration of the load
p(t)=blast pressure time-history function
Common explosives are detailed in Table 4.2 (Conrath et al., 2-11). It can be seen that there are two
major factors which may be considered when detailing blast load characteristics on a building;
depending on the explosive used there is a variance of 82%-170% the peak overpressure of TNT as
referred to previously. However, since the pressure is not directly related to the impulse created by an
equivalent weight of explosive it can be shown that the duration of loading must vary in order to
preserve equivalence of ratios. This difference in duration must therefore be accounted for in the
pressure time-history function, being sure to scale the time scale so that the integral of the pressure
loading function is equal to the impulse specified.
Equivalent Equivalent Pressure
Explosive Weight, Pressure Weight, Impulse Range
(Ibm) (Ibm) (psi)
ANFO 0.82 -- 1-100
Composition A-3 1.09 1.08 5-50
Composition B 1.11 0.98 5-50
1.20 1.30 100-1,000
Composition C-4 1.37 1.19 10-100
Cyclotol (70/30) 1.14 1.09 5-50
HBX-1 1.17 1.16 5-20
HBX-3 1.14 0.97 5-25
H-6 1.38 1.15 5-100
Minol 11 1.20 1.11 3-20
Octol (70/30, 75/25) 1.06 -- E
PBX - 9404 1.13 -- 5-30
1.70 1.20 100-1,000
PBX - 9010 1.29 -- 5-30
PETN 1.27 -- 5-100
Pentolite 1.42 1.00 5-100
1.38 1.14 5-600
1.50 1.00 100-1,000
Picratol 0.90 0.93 --
Tetryl 1.07 -- 3-20
Tetrytol (Tetryl/TNT)
(75/25, 70/30, 65/35) 1.06 -- E
TNETB 1.36 1.10 5-100
TNT 1.00 1.00 Standard
Tritonal 1.07 0.96 5-100
Table 4.2 Explosive characteristics
One last concern in the application of loads due to a blast event is the time at which the pressure shock
front of the blast load first reaches any structural element. Since the initial detonation shock velocity is
greater than the speed of sound, the shock wave travels supersonically. Experiments performed by
Henrych show that typical values for the shock front velocity (Vs) range from 7,100 m/s (23,300 ft/s) for
TNT to 8,450 m/s (27,700 ft/s) (Bulson). The resulting loading on a surface at one instance in time due to
a spherical charge is shown in Figure 4.2 and shows that modeling the loading of a blast load on a
structural element requires careful attention to scaling the arrival time of a blast load to ensure realistic
global time-history impulse characteristics.
Shock front velocity V
Radius r
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Figure 4.2 Propagation of blast wave from a spherical explosive charge (Source: Bulson)
4.4 Unconfined Behavior
Explosions which occur in free air, that is, the resulting expansion of gasses does not result in an
appreciable increase in surrounding pressure. With regard to attacks, unconfined explosions typically
result from vehicle bombs which occur outside of a facility and result, as mentioned previously, in
relatively uniform loading of the exterior surfaces of a structure. It is therefore necessary to distinguish a
blast event which is unconfined from one which is confined in order to develop the appropriate time-
history loading which the structure will experience.
4.4.1 Time-History Characteristics
An unconfined explosion has two distinct phases of pressure loading, the positive phase and negative
phase, is previously shown in Figure 4.1. This makes the modeling of external blast loading slightly
simpler than internal. A complication of modeling the blast load pressure diagram, however, results as
the impulse is scaled with distance, therefore causing a change in the positive and negative phase
durations with respect to distance from the blast load origin. The value of positive phase arrival and
duration are shown scaled according to Hopkinson-Cranz scaling in Figure 4.3 (Conrath et al., 2-13)..
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Figure 4.3 Unconfined blast load pressure characteristics (Source: Conrath et al., 2-13)
While there is little data that may be found on the negative phase duration, as it depends greatly on the
surrounding environment and restoration to atmospheric pressure, it has been found through the
examination of many typical unconfined blast pressure diagrams that the negative phase duration of a
blast load is typically on the order of 1-3 times the positive phase duration and the magnitude of
pressure on the order of 1/ 10 th the peak overpressure (Krauthammer,73).
4.4.2 Assumptions and Simplifications for Analysis
For computational efficiency, it is common that several assumptions be made to simplify the blast wave
characteristics. First, it is common to simplify the pressure diagram as linear with a triangular positive
phase having an instantaneous increase from atmospheric to peak overpressure at the arrival time of
the blast wave. This peak pressure dissipates until a triangular approximation may be used for
representing the negative phase. Also, since the duration periods of each phase are dependent on
standoff and explosive, it is necessary to establish a means of determining the duration in a reasonably
simplified manner (Punch, 136). Referring to Figure 4.3 and viewing the positive phase duration (td, on
the right axis) it is possible to view the plot in three distinct regions: a zone of immediate proximity with
a scaled distance of 0.5-2 ft where there is a duration on the order of 0.5 ms, a zone of close proximity
with a scaled distance of 2-5 ft where the duration is essentially constant at 1.5 ms and region of
decreasing proximity with a scaled distance of 5-100 ft. In the region of decreasing proximity, there is
fairly uniform logarithmic increase for which an approximate mathematical relationship can be
developed.
Determination of Positive Phase Duration
6
E
05
E
c4
0
3 -- Values read from Figurey = 1.10841n(x) + 0.1426
2 R2 = 0.%6354.
--- Log. (Values read from
0. 1i ___________________Figure 4.3)
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Distance from blast origin (ft)
Figure 4.4 Plot used to develop expression for positive phase duration
td=(1.10 8 4 x ln(R) +0.1426)ms
Equation 5
Figure 4.4 shows the Microsoft Excel plot used to determine the duration phase mathematical
relationship (Equation 5). It can be seen that a reasonable amount of confidence may be achieved by
fitting a logarithmic trend-line to the data. Additionally, to simplify the determination of the negative
phase duration, a multiplier of one, two and three may be used corresponding with the zones of
immediate proximity, close proximity, and decreasing proximity respectively, thus well correlating with
the typical range of negative phase durations and the increasing duration nature associated with
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increasing distance from a blast point of origin. Additionally, while not entirely accurate, the assumption
of arrival time based off of shock-wave velocity is proposed to simplify the relationship found
experimentally. While the arrival time behaves logarithmically rather than linearly, since the major
effect of arrival time is the differential loading of different parts of the structure and the plot of arrival
time in Figure 4.4 shows slight logarithmic behavior for smaller distances from blast origin this
assumption is deemed appropriate.
4.5 Confined Behavior
When an explosion occurs in a region where the escape of gas pressures is not essentially immediate,
attention must be paid to the effect on the increase in pressure following the main blast event. While a
great deal of the shock wave characteristics remain essentially the same as an unconfined explosion, an
internal explosion is also characterized by a gas loading phase associated with the pressure shock
following the blast wave impact and a quasi-static loading due to the inability of the pressure to
equilibrate with atmospheric pressure.
4.5.1 Time-History Characteristics
Pressure time-histories for confined explosions are largely variable. As shown in Figure 4.5 there are two
peaks corresponding with two distinct loading phases: the blast wave loading and the gas pressure
loading. Since the pressure loading phase of a confined explosion is governed by the venting of the
structure the second peak of the diagram may not be definitively determined without an extensive
study of flow of air within the structure. Additionally, the duration of the quasi-static phase of pressure
loading is determined by the ability of the structure's envelope to equilibrate with the outside
atmosphere. Therefore, while the primary blast wave impact, governed by the peak overpressure and
the time duration, is essentially the same as that detailed in Section 4.4.1 the total time-history diagram
must account for the pressure in a reasonable fashion.
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Figure 4.5 Confined explosion pressure time-history plot (Source: Conrath et al. 4-6)
4.5.2 Assumptions and Simplifications for Analysis
While the actual blast pressure time-history contains two distinct peaks, research by the U.S. Army,
Navy and Air Force have shown that it is reasonable to consider a bilinear pressure function which
essentially combines the effects of the blast wave and the quasi-static pressure loading (See Figure 4.6).
While actual pressure loads coincide in time with the blast wave impulse, they are not considered as
additive due to the arrival of the blast wave peak before the pressure load. It should also be noted that
the negative phase of the blast wave load does exist but is lower in magnitude than the gas pressure
loading magnitude (Conrath et al. 2-21). Additionally, the blast wave duration times are essentially the
same as for unconfined explosions and Equation 5 may be used in conjunction with Equation 2 to
determine the slope of the first portion of the bilinear approximation. Last to determine is the
magnitude and duration of the gas loading phase of the bilinear pressure time-history. Since this feature
is dependent completely on the venting of the structure, it is necessary that this characteristic be
reasonably approximated unless detailed study is possible. Through examination of multiple sources of
test data it can be established that the magnitude of the gas loading quasi-static phase is typically
between 1/5th and 1 / 10 th of the peak overpressure for typical structures with a duration on the order of
10 times the blast wave loading duration (Krauthammer, 74).
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Figure 4.6 Simplified confined explosion pressure time-history plot (Source: Structures to Resist...)
5 Simulation
In order to demonstrate the methods by which a probabilistic assessment of a structure's blast
performance may be carried out and by which data may be interpreted, the following herein seeks to
establish the performance of a hypothetical facility. Through the definition of reasonably considered
threats, security systems (both physical and operational) and site geometry, including a reasonably
designed structure, it is possible to establish the damage state of the structure under a blast event. With
automation the analysis may be repeated many times for a random distribution of blast origin locations,
explosive charge size, and likelihood of success in carrying out an attack in a desired region. It should be
noted that the probabilistic nature of the analysis ends with blast load determination as the building is
analyzed deterministically for practical purposes. The result of such a procedure is a Monte Carlo
simulation which allows an engineer to gain insight into the sensitivity of a structure to certain types of
threats and what attacks are most critical to prevent. In order to carry out this simulation, the program
Minitab was used to develop random data in accordance with desired distributions, the program Matlab
was used to develop the pressure time-history loading data for all structural members and the program
SAP 2000 v.14 was used to carry out the structural analysis and assess structural damage
5.1 Hypothetical Site
This section describes the facility to be analyzed. While the main goal of this simulation is to establish
structural performance, it is necessary, as detailed in Chapter 2, to establish the characteristics of the
entire site. The hypothetical site analyzed herein is considered to be a secure two story research facility
of importance which must facilitate visitors for operational reasons.
5.1.1 Programming
In order to display a facility which is feasibly demanding of a blast performance assessment, a mixed
facility considered to be of significance was established. As shown in Figure 5.1 the ground floor of the
facility consists of several different programs including a meeting room, an entrance and check-in space,
a laboratory and special equipment space and warehouse and delivery processing space to supplement
physical research activities. The upstairs of the structure is considered to be office space and is not
considered in the analysis beyond its contribution to service loading.
Figure 5.1 Ground-floor floor plan and programming
5.1.2 Site Access
The entire site of the facility, shown in Figure 5.2 shows the layout and special relations between the
different site regions and the structure itself. Two major passive security systems are evident in the site
layout with the implementation of bollards preventing the access of vehicles beyond a certain
perimeter. Additionally, a wall at the rear of the facility prevents the access of any vehicle with access to
the loading dock from entering the region of the facility protected by the bollards. For the purpose of
this simulation, these systems are completely effective and create a null zone of blast origins around the
structure. Additionally site access is considered to be limited with some efficiency by the operational
security points, including a security booth at the entrance of the parking lot and a gate limiting access to
the loading dock of the structure. Within the structure, certain regions are considered secure and are
protected with certain efficiency due to the presence of a security desk. However, as will be discussed
further in Section 5.3, regions are still subjected to a prescribed probability of success, allowing one to
determine the criticality of security operations for certain regions.
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Figure 5.2 Facility site plan
5.1.3 Structural System Detail
The structural system considered is a two story, three-bay by four-bay steel moment frame building with
infill beams and one way slabs. It is important to make the distinction at this point that the connections
considered for this simulation are designed for blast considerations, similar to the Side Plate moment
connections discussed in Section 3.1.2. This allows the use of a structural model which considers
moment connections and adequately allows both the formation and rotation of plastic hinges at frame
member ends. Without such connections, the limitations of connections used must be examined in
greater detail.
To ensure the realism of the simulation, the structure was designed for typical loads factored according
to LRFD standards. The actual deadweight of the structure was considered along with a 100 psf live load
considering office space per ASCE 7-05 and a "simplified procedure" wind load per ASCE 7-02 as
generated in SAP 2000 v.14. Ground floor columns were then increased to ensure only local failure
under the loss of any ground floor column as is typical for blast design to prevent progressive collapse.
Infill beams were modeled as simply supported while all column-to-column beams and girders were
modeled with fixed connections. The slabs were modeled as 4" reinforced concrete one-way slabs
spanning 6 feet between infill beams. The global finite element model is shown in Figure 5.3. It can be
seen that for the sake of examining importance of major structural elements that a transfer girder
spanning two bays is located at the front of the building to create a larger open span at the building's
entrance.
Figure 5.3 SAP 2000 model of structural frame
5.2 Asset Importance Definitions
In order to determine the performance of the structure in this simulation it is necessary that the
structures components and elements be analyzed for significance not only in regards to the global
behavior of the structure but also with regards to assets in the building. While the primary purpose of
this simulation is to determine the structural damage, structural damage may be indicative of asset
damage and therefore member significance may be weighted in order that damage to structure in
proximity to major assets can be used to determine overall financial damage to the structure. It should
be noted that while a significant source of monetary damage due to an explosive attack may come from
the destruction of non-structural elements this simulation does not account for such components.
5.2.1 Evaluation of Structural Member Significance
The establishment of structural member significance is a process which requires all primary assets in the
facility to be examined and the structural elements which these assets depend on for safety are
identified as the secondary assets. For this simulation it was determined that there are three primary
assets: life, structure and laboratory equipment. The primary assets of life and structure are inherently
strongly similar as the integrity of a structure following a blast event and the absence of progressive
collapse is necessary to minimize immediate loss of life and to allow egress from the structure. In this
simulation the two assets are distinguished by inhabitant density and path of egress. Therefore, for life
safety the "Deliveries/Warehouse" region, shown in Figure 5.1 is considered of less importance due to a
low inhabitant density. Additionally, the region in the immediate vicinity of the elevator and stair core
are considered to be more important as preservation of this region is necessary for safe an orderly
egress. The primary asset of laboratory equipment is characterized as being a high monetary risk
assuming that the equipment is costly to replace. Damage done to the immediate vicinity therefore
should be weighted in order to provide a better measure of the overall damage and necessary
downtime for the facility following a blast event.
5.2.2 Weighting Scheme for Defining Performance
Since not all structural members should be viewed as having the same importance or cost for
replacement it is necessary to create a scheme by which damage may be quantified, normalized and
used to judge the performance level of the building. To do so, it is necessary that heuristic and
engineering judgment be used. While such a weighting scheme could benefit from the input of cost
estimator who may have expertise in evaluating the exact cost and ease of repair. However, for this
simulation a relatively simple weighting scheme was used as detailed in Table 5.1. However, these
values only reflect the primary asset of the structure and are therefore weighted again for proximity to
primary assets as discussed in Section 5.2.1. This is done by assigning a multiplier of 1.2 to any elements
in immediate proximity to the "Specialty Equipment" room in the facility and a multiplier of 0.8 to any
elements in immediate proximity to the "Warehouse/Deliveries" room. Again, it should be reiterated
that these multipliers were developed using judgment and for an actual simulation an in-depth analysis
should be performed in order to adequately assign any multipliers related to assets. Once these
multipliers are applied to the weighting factors assigned for each structural element the final damage
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factor for each structural element in the model is assigned for the entire simulation. The number of each
type of structural element which fail during an iteration are multiplied by this damage factor and the
values summed to produce an overall damage index for the iteration.
Structural Element Weighting Factor
First floor perimeter column 5
First floor interior column 4
Second floor transfer girder 4
Second floor girder 3
Second floor beam/floor slab 2
Second floor perimeter column 3
Second floor interior column 2
Roof girder 2
Roof beam/floor slab 1
Table 5.1 Weighting factors for structural elements
In order to establish performance criteria for the building it is necessary to define thresholds for the
three basic performance levels. Again, for this simulation, this was done heuristically and attempts to
establish reasonable standards in order to define the performance of the building; for an actual
structure the thresholds could benefit from calibration from an experienced professional. The
thresholds were defined as presented in Table 5.2.
Performance Level Damage Index Threshold
Immediate Occupancy 0-15
Life Safety 16-100
Collapse Prevention >100
Table 5.2 Performance level definition
5.3 Threat Probability Definitions
5.3.1 Vehicle Bombs
Vehicle bombs are largely variable in size as well as likelihood of success in a facility with security
systems. For the purpose of this simulation, vehicle bomb weights were chosen in accordance with Table
4.1 with the exception that the maximum credible threat was chosen as "large moving van or water
truck." Therefore, the explosive size used in each iteration is a random choice of a 500, 1,000, 4,000,
10,000 or 30,000 lb TNT equivalent bomb as determined from the software MINITAB. After establishing
the site layout for the facility, it is then possible to reasonably divide the site into several zones where
the likelihood of an attack being successfully carried out is unique to others. This division of zones relies
on the location of security features and the probability of occurrence within these zones relies on the
effectiveness of the security system in place. Figure 5.4 shows the division of the site into five different
probability zones and Table 5.3 shows the associated probability of success of an attack within each
zone. It should be noted that the probabilities are normalized to the zone of highest probability as the
differential probabilities of success attempt only to reduce the number of trials within the simulation
which occur in a zone which is vastly unlikely. This helps to provide a more realistic assessment of the
types of threats and attacks which may be encountered in the life of the structure.
Figure 5.4 Definition of probability zones for vehicle threats
Zone 1 2 3 4 5
Probability of success 1.00 0.50 0.05 0.80 0.00
Table 5.3 Definition of probabilities for vehicle threats
5.3.2 Bombs on Person
To evaluate the effect of bombs on one's person, it was necessary to establish the maximum credible
explosive weight for an explosive device which may be reasonably considered for a person to carry into
the structure without security intervention. The explosive weights used for the simulation were
generated as a uniform distribution between five and fifty pounds per Sullivan et al. The location of the
blast origin was determined as a uniform distribution within the confines of the structure and the floor
plan was divided into two probability zones as shown below in Figure 5.5 and with the corresponding
probabilities of success described in Table 5.4. The lower probability of Zone 2 is due to the
consideration of the security desk meant to prevent unauthorized intruders into the
"Warehouse/Deliveries" and "Specialty Equipment" rooms of the facility.
Figure 5.5 Definition of probability zones for person threats
Zone 1 2
Probability of success 1.00 0.20
Table 5.4 Definition of probabilities for bombs on person threats
5.3.3 Mail and Package Bombs
The methodology used to evaluate mail and package bomb threats is very similar to that described for
bombs on a person in Section 5.3.2. Per Sullivan et al. the explosive weights were generated as a
random uniform distribution between one and five pounds. The random locations of the blast origin for
each iteration were determined as a uniform distribution within the confines of the structure and the
floor plan was divided into two different probability zones as shown in Figure 5.6 and with the
corresponding probabilities of success described in Table 5.5. The lower probability of success in Zone 1
comes from an assumption that the majority of attacks by mail and package would logically occur in the
deliveries and storage portion of the facility.
Figure 5.6 Definition of probability zones for mail and package threats
Zone 1 2
Probability of success 0.30 1.00
Table 5.5 Definition of probabilities for mail and package bomb threats
5.4 Blast Force Determination
While the determination of the blast threats was probabilistic for this simulation, the rest of the analysis
was calculated deterministically. Given a location and equivalent TNT weight it is possible to determine
the structural members which will be subjected to blast loading due to the geometry of the facility. It
was then necessary to calculate the charge standoff for all structural members exposed to the blast
loading and using Equation 1 and Equation 2 develop the peak overpressure. Using the parameters
described in Sections 4.4.2 & 4.5.2 the positive phase duration and either the negative phase
(unconfined) or gas loading duration (confined) were calculated for vehicle threats and bombs on
person and mail and package threats respectively. Given these characteristics, it was possible to divide
the pressure into its three principal coordinates to allow load assignment in the SAP model described in
Section 5.1.3.
In order to increase computation speed to a reasonable level to facilitate the running of a large number
of iterations necessary for a Monte Carlo simulation, it was deemed necessary and acceptable to
simplify the loading of the structure by computing loads for groups of elements rather than each
individual element in the SAP 2000 finite element model. In this respect, some accuracy was lost in the
blast loading of the structure. The pressure time-histories were developed automatically through the
implementation of a Matlab code which wrote unique files for each principal direction component of
each loading group every iteration. Typical pressure time-history functions are presented in Figure 5.8
and Figure 5.7 for the vehicle threat and mail and package threat simulations respectively. These two
figures display the difference between unconfined and confined pressure tim-histories. It should be
noted that the bombs on person threat pressure time-history functions are of the same nature of that
shown in Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7 Typical pressure time-history function for confined explosion (mail and package threat analysis)
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Figure 5.8 Typical pressure time-history function for unconfined explosion (vehicle threat analysis)
Since the data generated by this code was representative only of the pressures which the structural
elements would encounter it was necessary that unit loads corresponding to the projected surface area
for each principal direction component of each structural member. This unit load was then scaled
appropriately by the magnitude of the time-history functions which were applied as unique load cases
for all members and directional components.
5.5 Analysis Parameters
Using the finite element analysis program SAP 2000 v.14 it was possible to take all of the loading data
generated through the use of MINITAB and a Matlab code and determine the structural response. While
an analysis in which damage and large deflections is expected would typically warrant the use of direct
integration methods, it was found necessary for computational efficiency and speed to utilize non-linear
modal methods. Each iteration was therefore run as a non-linear time-history analysis. Damage was
determined by checking for the exceedance of member capacity due to a load combination which
included all blast loading cases for the iteration as well as the unfactored dead and live loads. The
analysis method used accounts for moment redistribution due to hinge formation as well as P-delta
effects on stiffness.
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6 Analysis Results
6.1 Evaluation of Damage/Performance
Through the running of multiple iterations it was possible to establish trends of damage caused in the
structure and the weighted damage index, allowing inferences to be drawn as to the overall
performance of the facility to specific types of attacks. While the factors of both charge weight and
standoff affect the structural damage caused by an explosive attack, since there is more control in this
simulation of the locations of the blast origins due to probability zone definitions, it becomes of greater
interest to establish minimum criteria of charge sizes related to damage states.
6.1.1 Vehicle Bombs
Due to the relatively large number of probability zones as well as large area of consideration for blast
origins in the vehicle bomb portion of the simulation, a higher number of simulations (40) were
performed than for interior blasts to develop the necessary data to draw conclusions from the
simulation. The discrete nature of explosive weights for the vehicle bomb charge weights used in the
simulation provides an example in which the effect of standoff and location to assets becomes strongly
evident. Figure 6.1 shows clearly that, as would be expected, there is an increase in damage inflicted on
the structure as the charge weight of the vehicle bomb is increased. It should be noted that the red line
(damage index = 15) denotes the threshold between immediate occupancy and life safety performance
while the orange line (damage index = 100) denotes the threshold between life safety and collapse
avoidance performance. Additionally, it can be seen that while the potential to inflict damage grows
considerably with increasing charge weight, the large variability evident in larger vehicle bombs shows a
strong dependence of damage on location and proximity to the structure.
Since the desired result from the simulation is to determine likelihoods of exceedance of defined
performance standards based off of two random variables, it was determined that the display of simple
percentages of likelihood of occurrence is the most valuable and all encompassing method of presenting
the data developed. Table 6.1 shows the likelihood of structural damage as well as performance of the
structure for the entire vehicle bomb portion of the simulation. It can be seen that given the parameter
definition of the hypothetical site, the likelihood of experiencing any damage at all is 42.5%. Also very
notably, it is shown that the likelihood of reaching collapse prevention performance, which is associated
with probable total loss, is 7.5%. These percentages are well supplemented by the necessary charge
weight apparently necessary to inflict certain levels of damage. It appears necessary that a vehicle bomb
of significantly greater weight than 10,000 lbs TNT equivalent, associated with a "small moving van or
delivery truck (Sullivan et al.)," is necessary to reach the collapse prevention performance state. Also, it
appears that it would be necessary for a vehicle bomb larger than a full-size sedan to be used in order to
reach the life-safety performance state.
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Figure 6.1 Vehicle bomb damage index vs. charge weight
Likelihood of Occurrence
Total 40
Iterations w/ Structural Damage 17 42.50%
Iterations with Immediate Occupancy Performance 30 75.00%
Iterations with Life Safety Performance 7 17.50%
Iterations with Collapse Prevention Performance 3 7.50%
Table 6.1 Vehicle bomb simulation building performance
6.1.2 Bombs on Person
Due to the decrease in variability for the parameters of bombs on a person compared to vehicle bombs,
it was deemed prudent to decrease the number of iterations to 25 in order to have adequate data from
which to draw conclusions. The data again was viewed with respect to charge weight, displayed in Figure
4
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6.2 with the threshold between immediate occupancy and life safety performance (damage index=15)
denoted by the orange line. As expected, there is a trend of increasing damage with increasing charge
weight corresponding with an increasing likelihood of life safety performance of the building. It is
evident that it is unlikely that any structural damage will be caused by explosive charges of less than ten
lbs TNT equivalent while it appears that an explosive charge around 30 lbs TNT equivalent is necessary
to exceed immediate occupancy criteria on a regular basis.
The likelihood probabilities presented in Table 6.2 show that due to the immediate proximity to
structural elements (i.e. all blast origins occurred within the building) leads to a higher likelihood of
structural damage compared to the vehicle bomb simulation even though the charge sizes are
significantly less. However, it can also be seen that in no instance was the collapse prevention
performance state reached.
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Figure 6.2 Bombs on person damage index vs. charge weight
Likelihood of Occurrence
Total 25
Iterations w/ Structural Damage 13 52.00%
Iterations with Immediate Occupancy Performance 16 64.00%
Iterations with Life Safety Performance 9 36.00%
Iterations with Collapse Prevention Performance 0 0.00%
Table 6.2 Bombs on person simulation building performance
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6.1.3 Mail and Package Bombs
Through running the simulation with regards to mail and package bombs it was found that such iteration
results were trivial. It is apparent that while charge weights between one and five lbs TNT equivalent
should not be neglected as a threat, they lack the ability to cause damage to an adequately designed
steel moment frame.
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Figure 6.3 Mail and package bombs damage index vs. charge weight
Likelihood of Occurrence
Total 25
Iterations w/ Structural Damage 0 0.00%
Iterations with Immediate Occupancy Performance 25 100.00%
Iterations with Life Safety Performance 0 0.00%
Iterations with Collapse Prevention Performance 0 0.00%
Table 6.3 Mail and package bombs simulation building performance
6.1.4 Comparison of Results
The three different threat simulations help to provide not only a holistic view of the performance of the
structure but also insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the structure's resistance to threats. It is
apparent that, with regards to structural damage, the majority of all major attack types result in little to
no structural damage. Additionally, of attacks which may cause significant structural damage, very
special conditions are necessary in order to reach collapse prevention performance. By viewing these
. ............. ...... 
results it is possible to prioritize which attack threats should receive further attention. Vehicle bombs of
10,000 lbs TNT equivalent and greater and bombs on a person of 30 lbs TNT equivalent pose the largest
and most consistent threat. The matter of threat consistency becomes very apparent when comparing
the magnitude of range of damage indices associated with vehicle bombs with that of bombs on a
person for these consistently damaging charge weights: 223 and 78.7 respectively. This large range for
vehicle bombs suggests that location rather than charge weight truly dominates the influence on
structural damage and a more pointed analysis with smaller variance in location be attempted in order
to better represent a well-planned attack rather than a uniform distribution.
6.2 Recommendations
The focus of this simulation was indeed to establish a method by which a probabilistic analysis may be
carried out with the interest of determining structural damage. Given the capabilities of the analysis, it
was necessary to weight structural damage in an attempt to understand total damage on the structure.
However, for a real world exercise, it is suggested that more exact methods be used in order to quantify
and understand non-structural damage. While the finite element program SAP 2000 v.14 was utilized for
time-history responses, there have been programs more tailored to blast analysis developed, such as the
program BLASTX (Conrath et al., 2-12). Utilizing such a program provides a more accurate analysis for
non-structural elements such as unreinforced walls but also, through fluid and particle finite element
modeling, accounts for pressure amplification due to geometry as well as the effects of fragmentation
and penetration. While a similar probabilistic method could be implemented, the use of more accurate
and tailored modeling programs may indeed increase the reliability of probabilistic risk assessment.
Also, it is recommended that a larger number of simulations be run in order to increase the reliability of
the results and increase the odds of detecting behavior very specific to certain blast characteristics.
It is also recommended that more emphasis in real world simulations be placed on the quantification of
assets and the differentiation between damage and loss. Due to the hypothetical nature of the facility
and simulation performed there was no true distinction between damage and loss as they, without
specific asset quantification, were deemed totally interdependent and therefore reported strictly as a
weighted damage index. However, as the trend of performance based engineering moves towards
probabilistic confidence in repair costs these two factors must be separated and dealt with in a more
targeted nature.
7 Conclusions
As blast engineering becomes more prevalent and standard in the field of structural engineering, it is
inevitable that the same approach which has been developed to deal with the stochastic nature of
earthquakes will be applied to the field. It can be seen that there has been a large focus on developing
building technologies which better enable a structure to withstand prescribed blasts and the future
developments of such technologies is crucial. Regardless of the building codes and standards used by
design engineers, these developments will prove effective in preserving life and monetary investments.
However, the analysis technique and design standards of blast engineering have lagged behind its
extreme event partner of earthquake engineering. Given the inherently similar nature of unknown
loading, it is necessary that engineers in the field of blast engineering begin to take steps to establish a
probability based design method similar to the current performance-based earthquake engineering
methods.
It has been shown herein, through a probabilistic simulation of a hypothetical site, that, given an
extensive security methods and efficiency analysis, it is possible to attain valuable data from which
actionable conclusions may be drawn in a performance-based manner. Having established a procedure
and framework by which threats may be defined, likelihoods of success be accounted for and loading be
defined, it is possible to quantify damage in a weighted manner which may provide valuable information
for the engineer, owner, security representative and indeed all share holders of a facility. This
information may be used to not only verify performance expectations but provide insight into the faults
of the facility layout and possibly lead to remedies for such faults. It is desired that in future work,
methods be refined and implemented in practice side by side with the deterministic standards
established by authorities in the field.
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